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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Lester Jones’
petition for post-conviction relief.  In its order denying relief, however, the district
court failed to address two of Mr. Jones’ claims.  On appeal, Mr. Jones contends
that the failure to address all of his claims was error, as Idaho Code section
19-4907 requires a court to “make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its
conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented” at a post-conviction
evidentiary hearing.  He asks that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment
and dismissal order, and that it remand his case to the district court for further
proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In early 2011 or so, Mr. Jones developed a friendship and, eventually, a
relationship, with D.R., the daughter of a couple of his friends.  (See R. Sealed
Ex., pp.45-46, 47)  When D.R. was seventeen years old, that relationship
became sexual.  (R. Sealed Ex., p.46.)  As a result, D.R. became pregnant and
eventually had a baby girl.  (R. Sealed Ex., p.46.)  Mr. Jones was in love with
D.R. and wanted to marry her and raise their daughter with her (R. Sealed Ex.,
pp.46, 47); however, that was not to be.  In 2012, Mr. Jones was charged with a
single count of “statutory” rape, as well as a sentencing enhancement for having
been previously convicted of a sex offense.  (40863 R., pp.9-10, 26-27, 28-29.)1
1 The Reporter’s Transcript and Clerk’s Record from Mr. Jones’ prior direct
appeal, No. 40863, was apparently attached to Mr. Jones’ petition for post-
conviction  relief  as  Exhibit  E.   (See, e.g., R., pp.9, 22, 87, 134, 138, 146.)
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In his criminal case, Mr. Jones pled guilty to statutory rape and agreed to
pay restitution and, in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the sentencing
enhancement and recommend a sentence which contained a fixed portion that
did not exceed ten years.  (See 40863 Tr., p.1, L.23 – p.3, L.16.)  The district
court accepted the agreement and Mr. Jones’ guilty plea (see 40863 Tr., p.19,
Ls.9-21), and ultimately imposed a sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed
(40863 Tr., p.54, Ls.10-13; 40863 R., p.45.)
Mr. Jones timely appealed from his judgment of conviction, challenging his
sentence as being excessive and, therefore, an abuse of the district court’s
discretion.  (See R., pp.33-34.)  The Court of Appeals rejected his arguments
though and affirmed his sentence.  (R., pp.33-34.)
Mr. Jones also filed a timely motion, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35,
seeking a sentence reduction.  (40863 R., pp.46-47.)  That motion was denied by
the district court (see 40863 R., p.53), and no separate notice of appeal was filed
from the district court’s order (see R., pp.8, 41).
Thereafter, Mr. Jones filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp.6-17; see also R., pp.19-36 (Exhibits A through D in support of petition);
However, it was omitted from the Clerk’s Record in this appeal.  Additionally, the
district court judicially noticed the direct appeal record—both in ruling on the
State’s motion for summary dismissal (see R., p.116 n.1), and in determining
whether Mr. Jones was entitled to post-conviction relief following his evidentiary
hearing (see Tr., p.162, L.13 – p.63, L.23; see also R., pp.137-38 (district court
“augment[ing]” the record below with the appellate record from the direct
appeal)).  Thus, concurrently herewith, Mr. Jones is filing a motion asking this
Court to take judicial notice of the appellate record from the prior direct appeal.
Assuming that motion will be granted, Mr. Jones uses the prefix “40863” in all of
his citations to the record from the direct appeal.
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R. Sealed Ex., pp.1-41 (Exhibit F in support of the petition).2)  In that petition he
asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal case.
(See generally R., pp.9-15.)  He proffered multiple ineffectiveness claims, all
revolving around his two attorneys’ performance in three stages of his criminal
case—the guilty plea stage, the sentencing stage, and the notice of appeal
stage.  (See generally R., pp.9-15.)  The claims that are relevant to this appeal
are as follows: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a private,
confidential psychosexual evaluation before (or in lieu of) Mr. Jones’ participation
in the court-ordered evaluation (R., p.14; see also R., p.25); and (2) counsel was
ineffective for failing to inform Mr. Jones of his right to appeal the district court’s
denial of his Rule 35 motion for a sentence reduction (R., p.15; see also
R., p.27).
The State moved to dismiss Mr. Jones’ petition in its entirety.  (R., pp.40-
46 (answer), p.76 (motion to dismiss), pp.110-13 (memorandum in support of
motion).)  Following a hearing (see R., p.115; Tr., pp.1-40), the district court
granted the motion in part, dismissing a small handful of claims relating to the
performance of Mr. Jones’ first attorney in the early portion of the criminal case,
and denied it in part, ruling Mr. Jones was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
the bulk of his claims—those relating to the performance of his second attorney
in the latter portion of the case.  (R., pp.119-21.)  Among the claims surviving
summary dismissal were the two ineffectiveness claims identified above—
2 As noted, Exhibit E, the Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s Transcript from
Mr. Jones’ direct appeal, No. 40863, was omitted from the Clerk’s Record in this
case.  (See note 1, supra.)
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(1) failure to obtain a private, confidential psychosexual evaluation, and (2) failure
to inform Mr. Jones of his right to appeal the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Jones offered evidence in support of most
of his claims, including those at issue in this appeal.  With regard to his claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a private, confidential psychosexual
evaluation, Mr. Jones testified as follows:
Q. Did Mr. Garner [counsel] ever go over the risks and
benefits to you of taking or not taking the psychosexual evaluation?
A. No, he did not.
Q. Did he ever go over with you the option of a private,
confidential psychosexual evaluation?
A. No, he did not.
(Tr., p.115, Ls.8-14 (emphasis added).)3  Additionally, on cross-examination,
Mr. Jones testified he did not ask his counsel about a private evaluation because
he “didn’t know we could do one.”  (Tr., p.127, Ls.10-13.)
With regard to his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform
him of his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion,
Mr. Jones testified as follows:
Q. Okay, was a Rule 35 motion denied?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Did you know you had a right to appeal that?
A. I did not know I had a right to appeal it until after I got over
to Boise four days later, after—after Boise I was four days late to
appeal the Rule 35.
3 Mr. Jones’ former defense attorney, Mr. Garner, was also asked about whether
he had discussed with Mr. Jones the possibility of a private, confidential
evaluation; he testified, “I don’t recall that.”  (Tr., p.74, Ls.21-24.)
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Q. Four days past the deadline?
A. Past the deadline.
Q. Would you have appealed, had you known?
A. Yes, I would have.
(Tr., p.120, Ls.13-24; accord Tr., p.140, Ls.8-11.)4  This testimony was
corroborated by that of Mr. Jones’ sister, Sharon Sanford, who had been actively
involved in her brother’s case.  She testified as follows:
Q. After it [the Rule 35 motion] was denied, did Mr. Garner
explain to you and the family about whether Lester could appeal
that decision?
A. No, we didn’t—weren’t even aware that he could appeal
it.
(Tr., p.92, Ls.19-23.)  Additionally, the district court took judicial notice of the
transcript from the Rule 35, specifically to determine whether the court had
advised Mr. Jones of his right to appeal the denial of his motion.  (See Tr., p.160,
L.23 – p.161, L.10.)  A review of that transcript reveals it did not.  (See R. Ex.,
p.18, L.5 – p.26, L.10.)
Following the evidentiary hearing, as well as submission of a
supplemental brief by Mr. Jones (see R., pp.145-56), the district court entered an
order denying post-conviction relief.  (See R., pp.158-71.)  Despite the fact that
Mr. Jones offered evidence in support of both of the two claims discussed above,
in its order denying post-conviction relief, the district court omitted any reference
to those claims.  (See R., pp.158-71.)
4 Again, Mr. Garner, was unable to recall a specific discussion with Mr. Jones.
He testified, “I don’t recall if we discussed that [order denying Mr. Jones’ Rule 35
motion] or not.”  (Tr., p.77, Ls.14-17.)
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The same day it filed its written decision denying post-conviction relief, the
district court entered a written judgment in favor of the State.  (See R., p.173.)
Thereafter, Mr. Jones filed a timely notice of appeal.  (See R., pp.175-78.)  On
appeal, Mr. Jones contends the district court erred in failing to make specific
findings of fact, and by failing to state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to
each issue presented by Mr. Jones at his evidentiary hearing.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact, and by
failing to state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented
by Mr. Jones at his evidentiary hearing.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Failing To Make Specific Findings Of Fact, And By
Failing To State Expressly Its Conclusions Of Law, Relating To Each Issue
Presented By Mr. Jones At His Evidentiary Hearing
Idaho’s version of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPCPA”)5
provides that, assuming a post-conviction petition survives summary dismissal,6
an evidentiary hearing must be held. See I.C. § 19-4907(a).  At that hearing,
“[t]he court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other
evidence and may order the applicant brought before it for the hearing.” Id.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court is required to enter an order
containing “specific findings of fact, and stat[ing] expressly [the court’s]
conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented.” Id. (emphasis added).7
This requirement applies so long as there was some evidence presented on a
given claim for relief. State v. Jensen, 126 Idaho 35, 38 (Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, Mr. Jones asserted that one of his attorneys, Mr. Garner,
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to obtain a private,
confidential psychosexual evaluation in advance (or in lieu) of the court-ordered
evaluation (R., p.14; see also R., p.25), and, later, in failing to advise Mr. Jones
of his right to appeal the order denying his Rule 35 motion (R., p.15; see also R.,
p.27).  As detailed above, at the evidentiary hearing the district court evidence on
both of these claims.  Thus, the district court’s order denying post-conviction
5 I.C. §§ 19-4901 through -4911.
6 See I.C. § 19-4906(b) & (c).
7 The purpose of this requirement is to provide a record sufficient for an appellate
court to review the propriety of the order. State v. Morris, 101 Idaho 120, 124
(1980); State v. Jensen, 126 Idaho 35, 38 (Ct. App. 1994); Maxfield v. State, 108
Idaho 493, 497 (Ct. App. 1985).
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relief was required to include specific findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect to each of these ineffective assistance claims.  I.C. § 19-4097; Jensen,
126 Idaho at 38.  However, it did not; the district court’s order did not even
mention these claims, much less contain specific findings of fact and conclusions
of law.  (See generally R., pp.158-71.)  Accordingly, the district court erred.
Because the district court erred in failing to make any findings of fact or
reach any conclusions of law regarding two of Mr. Jones’ ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, this Court should remand the case for a new evidentiary
hearing. See Morris, 101 Idaho at 124 (finding error in the trial court’s failure to
comply with section 19-4907(a) and, based on that error, remanding the case for
a rehearing).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the district court’s judgment, as well as its order denying post-
conviction relief, and that it remand this case to the district court for a new
hearing and a proper order on Mr. Jones’ petition.
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